GEORET

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### DD/I Comments

The DD/I has established a Personnel Practices Committee consisting of the Deputy ADs and the Assistant to the DD/I (Admin.) subordinate to the Intelligence Career Board. This committee is now developing a more centralized career planning effort for the area. ONE's new Executive Officer will represent that office on this committee.

### IG Comments

Status of recommendation: Concurrence. The ONE-DD/I actions satisfy the IG's objectives.

25X1A6a 25X1A6a DD/I has furnished officers to DD/P for the purpose recommended; only recently two to and one each shortly to go to and and DD/I has always been prepared to provide this type of support if requested to do so by DD/P.

Status of recommendation: DD/I's
position not indicated. IG did not
propose that DD/I await DD/P requests.
There is no ONE officer among the four 25X1A6a
men earmarked for Otly a firm
DD/I-DD/P commitment to the proposal in
principle will allow ONE staff officers
to do serious career planning for
overseas experience. Ad hoc arrangements
may well occur from time to time but they
do not satisfy the intent of the recommendation.

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### INSPECTOR GENERAL'S SURVEY OF THE OFFICE OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES

Replies to Recommendations with IG Comments Added

### IG Recommendations

IG Recommendation #la: "The DD/I and AD/NE develop a long-term career program for ONE staff personnel carefully articulated with the DD/I career planning policy."

IG Recommendation #lb: "The DD/I negotiate with DD/P the establishment of at least five slots--to be furnished by the DD/I--at major stations in critical areas of the world and staff these positions with DD/I officers assigned to render close substantive support to chiefs of station in the respective areas."

### AD/NE Comments

Insofar as anyone can devise long-term career programs for staff personnel, I feel that we have done it. A better effort to integrate O/NE planning with other components of the DD/I is doubtless possible. I look to the new O/NE Executive Officer, who was a member of the IG Survey Team and who has had a fairly broad experience in DD/I components for a very impressive assist in this matter.

It is noted that this recommendation is addressed specifically to the DD/I and to the AD/NE only by indirection. It has my heartiest endorsement. Indeed, I have argued this matter over the years with present and past DD/P's, their division chiefs, and a number of their Chiefs of Station. My point has been that there is no Chief of Station who would not benefit immeasurably by having a firsthand substantive man from DD/I at his elbow, and that the DD/I offices would gain vastly by the experience. The rub, of course, is not DD/T's unwillingness to find the slots. It has been the other way. DD/P and the Chiefs of Station have felt that they can best use the limited number of official cover slots for their own operational purposes.

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### DD/I Comments

All DD/I Vacancy Notices are distributed through the Personnel Operations Division of the Office of Personnel to the Central Clandestine Services Personnel Division.

#### IG Comments

Status of recommendation: DD/I's position not fully indicated. DD/I should secure DD/P's agreement to circulate notices throughout his area and to nominate candidates. (EE Survey has found that reports officers are a likely source of candidates and of exchange arrangements.)

Status of recommendation: Concurrence and implementation.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

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### IG Recommendations

IG Recommendation #lc: "ONE vacancies be announced in DD/P staffs and divisions and the DD/P regularly nominate qualified officers for each vacancy as possible candidates for staff service tours in ONE."

IG Recommendation #2: "The DD/I initiate necessary steps to authorize an increase of six professional positions in the ONE Estimates Staff to provide increased flexibility for the AD/NE to administer his personnel program."

IG Recommendation #3: "The AD/NE adopt a policy of filling one of his staff positions with an officer from OSI serving on a rotational basis."

IG Recommendation #4: "The AD/NE divide his present

into separate staffs for the two regions and pursue as a staffing objective the maintenance of three or four estimator specialists in each of the new units."

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> > 25X1A9a

### AD/NE Comments

Again, this recommendation is not addressed to the AD/NE, but to DD/P. It has my hearty endorsement. A number of our best staff members have come to us from junior positions in DD/P. We have been delighted with the work of those who stayed. I am sure that those who returned to DD/P did so with a fresh appreciation of how finished intelligence is produced, distributed, and used, and, above all, of the value of raw intelligence to the final product.

This action is completed. O/NE has filled all but two of the new positions.

I heartily concur. We have begun negotiations with OSI. Obviously, there will be difficulties because the man to do our work will, almost by definition, be found among the AD/SI's most valuable middle-grade analysts.

I believe that the IG and any other officer of the Agency who knows of this strangely mixed group realizes that it results purely and simply from our inability to recruit the required number of Since the IG's report, things are looking up.

As soon as we can find a sufficiently specialist to head the

the separation will be made. Meanwhile, it will have to continue under excellent management.

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### DD/I Comments

This is now provided for with the approval by the DCI of a number of "pool" supergrade slots in the DD/I for just such a purpose. Two individuals, one from ONE, have been nominated for promotion under this system.

#### IG Comments

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

At one time a senior DD/I officer was attached to State's Policy Planning Staff but a new head of the Staff felt CIA participation was not needed or wanted. The present Staff head might well feel differently. I will explore this.

It is possible a CIA detailee to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense or International Security Affairs might gain some useful experience. AD/NE is discussing this with Deputy Assistant Secretary William P. Bundy.

We agree that State Department membership on the ONE Board would be useful and have made representations toward this end. Of course the Defense Department is already represented by the service people on the Board but we will bring up the matter of an exchange when talking to Bundy

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

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### IG Recommendations

IG Recommendation #5: "The DD/I with the Director of Personnel devise a system that will permit the promotion to super grade of selected estimators without changing their positions or responsibilities. This should be done with the utmost discretion and only in those cases where it is determined that it is in the best interests of the Agency."

IG Recommendation #6: "The DD/I arrange with appropriate State and Defense officials the assignment of able ONE staff officers to their policy and planning staffs for specific tours of duty. Reciprocal arrangements should be encouraged."

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### AD/NE Comments

Again, note that this recommendation is addressed to the DD/I and the Director of Personnel. It has my hearty concurrence.

Again, addressed to the DD/I. Again, my concurrence. I have already been in touch with Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense William P. Bundy as to a possible switch of one of my Far East experts, (at the National War College this year) with someone from Bundy's office. Actually, the experience would be of such value to and subsequently to 0/NE, that if Bundy cannot find a proper nominee from his group, I would be willing to have go anyway. We are exploring similar arrangements with State.

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### DD/I Comments

DD/I Vacancy Notice procedure calls for distribution to all DD/I employees. Anyone may apply from any office. All overseas positions are advertised. However, certain overseas positions calling for scientific or economic qualifications are apt to always be filled by OSI or ORR personnel. I agree with AD/NE that generally ONE people will be best qualified for the senior position but candidates from other offices will always be considered.

### IG Comments

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

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### IG Recommendations

IG Recommendation #7: "The DD/I insure that any of his employees with proper qualifications will be considered for any existing vacancy in his directorate. Care should be exercised to insure that no position, particularly those overseas, be identified with any one DD/I office."

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### AD/NE Comments

Although this recommendation is addressed to the DD/I, its final sentence is of particular importance to O/NE. One overseas job, that of 25X1X7 the CIA representative to the 25X1X7 in has from the beginning (1952) been held by one of the most 25X1A6a senior members of the O/NE staff.

job may be, its heart and soul has been estimates. The wanted to have, and we have wented to send, a man who has a sophisticated grasp of the whole estimating business and particularly an intimate knowledge of the U.S. system of estimating. This is not knowledge which one procures with a few hours of briefing or even a few weeks of experience. men whom we have sent and who have enjoyed the respect and confidence of community, have been in estimates for years. With an absolute minimum of trans-Atlantic communication, they have been able to explain to a T to their colleagues why the problems were formulated as they were and how the basic judgments came out as they did.

To my mind, the above argues most

strongly that no one be sent to the job who does not have this kind of background. For a decade the job has been the biggest plum in O/NE. O/NE staff men begin aspiring to it almost from their entry on duty. It has been a very important incentive, not merely to turn in a good performance but to develop the kind of global competence that the job requires. This has been of great importance to the men themselves and to the Office. I do not want to argue that there is no officer outside O/NE who could handle the job. I do, however, most emphatically wish to make the point that I personally would not want to send a non-0/NE man to the job who had not spent as much as a year working as a member of the O/NE

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DD/I Comments

IG Comments

Status of recommendation #8: DD/I position not indicated.

Status of recommendation #9: Concurrence.

Status of recommendation: Non-concurrence. It is still the IG's opinion that DD I and AD/ONE can take further measures to enhance the Board's role so that good men will be attracted and stimulated.

Status of recommendation: Non-concurrence. Perhaps the IG recommendation was devices in its wording. The intention was to recommend sufficiently frequent use of the panel to fulfill the objectives mentioned in the reply of AD/ONE. One or two meetings per year rather than six or eight meetings might serve this purpose. The reduction would both economize on staff time and heed the staff's widely held reservations about the intrinsic worth of the Princeton Panel.

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has reinforced this belief. Both the past and present DCI's are fully aware of the shortcomings of the Princeton group as a major contributor to the substance of estimates. I know that Mr.Dulles, and I helieve that Mr.McCone also, is aware of the value of this group from the point of view of strict public relations. Any determination to liquidate the organization must be a determination of the DCI made in full reali-

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DD	$/\mathtt{I}$	Comments

### IG Comments

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

The DD/I has presented these requirements to the DD/S and has been assured of relief as a high priority matter in the space allocation review now under way for the whole building.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

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### IG Recommendations

IG Recommendation #11b: "The AD/NE pursue a policy of consultation with properly cleared individuals regarded by his staff and Board as capable of making constructive contributions to specific estimates particularly in the drafting phase."

IG Recommendation #12: "The AD/NE take steps to acquire a slot and recruit an Assistant Administrative Officer."

IG Recommendation #13: "The AD/NE request the DD/I to make the strongest possible representation to the DD/S to make minimal adequate space available for the now badly overcrowded Estimates Staff."

IG Recommendation #14: "The AD/NE poll the intelligence community periodically to determine the continuing usefulness of the Cold War Survey."

IG Recommendation #15: "The AD/NE, in consultation with USIB representatives, establish firm guidelines delineating the conditions under which a post-mortem and/or validity study be prepared."

IG Recommendation #16: "The AD/NE take the initiative to invite the representative to visit ONE more frequently for general and substantive intelligence discussions."

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### AD/NE Comments

Concur. We have done a good amount of this in the past and obviously will enlarge our efforts.

This has been accomplished.

This has been taken care of.

Not necessary. The Cold War Weekly Survey is dead.

Concur. This problem is now under active study.

Concur. There is, of course, a very difficult fundamental problem which the IG seems unaware of. It is that the Office of National Estimates is under strictest injunction by the USIB not to discuss substance of the estimates being worked on until USIB has authorized their release to the Similarly we are enjoined not to discuss our schedule of forthcoming estimates. Thus, our relations with the representative in Washington have been confined to the discussion of estimates already released to the and certain internal O/NE memoranda which are not a part of the formal schedule of estimates. Perhaps even

with these ground-rules we could enlarge our

contacts and will endeavor to do so.

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### DD/I Comments

The standard distribution of NTEs now numbers about 400 and all appropriate policy makers in the Executive Branch do or can see them. I question the need for a personal transmittal and believe the request for evaluation and comment on each estimate might be an unacceptable burden on senior officials.

I will insure that the OSI and ORR research programs are made available to ONE for review and that comment is invited. Of course the research programs are attuned to many requirements beyond those of ONE, but obvious holes in the programs related to planned ONE production should be identified.

This suggestion may have some merit. However, the decision to carry it out is closely bound up in the considerations of the estimating process which I wish to discuss with the DCI.

### IG Comments

Status of recommendation: Non-concurrence. Both AD/ONE and DD/I express their doubts about the practical value of this recommendation. In effect this recommendation is a companion piece to #20 which urges higher level, face-to-face discussions with policy people in setting terms of reference for new estimates. Mr. Rostow pushes this idea with enthusiasm. The most critical estimates will always tend to receive full attention from all appropriate government officials. We were thinking in particular of estimates on particular countries where assessment of estimating problems and results, for example by AID, USIS, or military assistance officials would be of interest. Occasional follow-up would also give the Director further perspective on the estimating process.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence.

Status of recommendation: Concurrence with qualifications. No commitment by DD I to take action. During the inspection we read a paper written by a senior Board member outlining the deficiencies in a specific estimating performance of the USIB Scientific Intelligence Committee (SIC). The paper was never surfaced. Our objective here was to have the issues aired and resolved and to verify that similar issues do not exist elsewhere among the USIB committees.

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### IG Recommendations

IG Recommendation #17: "The DD/I transmit a personal copy of each estimate to selected Government officials to widen the readership and increase the influence of estimates among policy makers. Each copy should be accompanied by a personal letter from the DCI, DDCI, or DD/I requesting an evaluation and comments on its utility."

### AD/NE Comments

This recommendation is addressed to the DD/I. I certainly see no harm in trying it. I am very dubious that it would increase the quantity or quality of NIE readership.

IG Recommendation #18: "The AD/NE insure that ONE review and comment constructively on the ORR and OSI research programs on a regular basis."

IG Recommendation #19: "The AD/NE submit to the USIB via the DD/I a proposal for review of USIB committee coordinating and publishing procedures; that the review be performed by the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination."

This recommendation, it seems to me, should in the first instance be addressed to AD/SI and AD/RR. In the past we have not solicited advance glimpses of their research programs, and indeed I would be reluctant to do so in the future. However, when, as has happened in the past, the AD/RR has requested our comments, we have given the request most serious consideration and forwarded our best effort.

I do not understand how the AD/NE has any role to play in this matter.

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### IG Recommendations

IG Recommendation #8: "The policy of having a representative from each of the three military services on the Board be reconsidered."

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IG Recommendation #9: "The AD/NE request the Director of Central Intelligence to ask the State FOIAb5 Department for the services on the Board of National Estimates of a named individual of ambassadorial rank."

FOIAb5

FOIAb5

IG Recommendation #10: "The AD/NE explore with the DD/I ways and means of enhancing the Board's role so that good men can be attracted and stimulated."

IG Recommendation #11a: "The AD/NE terminate as a matter of regular practice the use of ONE consultants in panel consultations." 25X1A5a1

### AD/NE Comments

I have had some discussion with the Director, both with respect to service representation on the Board and with respect to a scientific member and a member from the very senior ranks of the Foreign Service. Mr. McCone has spoken of approaching the Director of

hope he goes forward with this. I have also heard that

might be available for parttime work on the Board. He would be my own preferred candidate above almost all Foreign Service eligibles. If the Director would prefer to have a Foreign Service Officer who is still on the active list, I recommend that he maintain the initiative of approach, laying before the Secretary of State a panel of names from which the Secretary might choose.

This is an unexceptionable exhortation. I assume that the IG did not mean to imply by it that good men had not been attracted to the Board and had not been stimulated by its activities.

I take it that this recommendation is addressed to the matter of the

The termination of this institution lies by no means in the hands of the AD/NE. All of the members of the Panel regard themselves as appointees of the DCI (as indeed they are) and as assisting him in his ultimate responsibility with respect to National Intelligence Estimates. The presence of Mr. Dulles at a great many of the meetings and of Mr. McCone at at least one, has reinforced this belief. Both the past and present DCI's are fully aware of the shortcomings of the Princeton group as a major contributor to the substance of estimates. I know that Mr. Dulles, and I helieve that Mr.McCone also, is aware of the value of this group from the point of view of strict public relations. Any determination to liquidate the organization must be a determination of the DCI made in full reali-

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### DD/I Comments

Present procedure on terms of reference calls for CIA to coordinate them with USIB agencies. In most cases this is sufficient.

The best way to get at the problem here is for ONE to pin down the requestor of the NTE (White House, IAS, etc.) as to exactly what it is they want covered.

To try to personally involve policy makers in this exercise would be impractical in most instances.

### IG Comments

Status of recommendation: Non-concurrence with qualifications. Mr. Rostow argued the need for this. Most ONE staff officers are strongly favorable. They are usually left out of discussions seeking to clarify terms of reference.

I do not feel the review suggested here is the responsibility of USIB or of the Assistant for Coordination. It is the continuing responsibility of the DD/I and the DCI.

Status of recommendation: Non-concurrence. DD/I does not state his views on the quality of the USIB estimating performance and does not commit himself to take any specific action.

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### IG Recommendations

IG Recommendation #20: "The DD/I establish the policy of holding face-to-face discussions between appropriate estimators and U.S. policy making officials on the terms of reference of each forthcoming national intelligence estimate; that the notes of such discussions be appended to the present terms of reference for each forthcoming estimate."

IG Recommendation #21: "The DD/I in concert with the Assistant to the DCI for Coordination propose to the USIB a review of management aspects of the USIB estimating process for the purpose of recording agreed deficiencies in estimating performance, improving procedures, establishing standards of personnel selection and career management, and evaluating periodically the objectives and levels of research effort in the intelligence agencies."

### AD/NE Comments

This, again, is directed to the DD/I. Obviously, the AD/NE is a party at interest. This recommendation makes sense only if it is restricted. A considerable number of our estimates would not be affected by the kind of discussion noted in this recommendation. Other estimates where the nature of the request is obscure, where we are uncertain of the policy issues which have dictated the estimate in the first place, or where the problem is so badly phrased that we can make no sense of it have caused us invariably to go back to the policy maker requestor for clarification. We have also frequently submitted the Terms of Reference document to the requestor, asking whether or not we are on the right track. In short I think we have done very well in this matter for a long period of years.

The IG here slips gently into one of the big problems of the estimative business, namely, how to improve the quality of the written contributions the USIB agencies make to NIE's, how to improve the quality of the research which lies behind such contributions, and how to make sure that every agency is represented at our coordinating sessions by the right kind of intelligence officer. In my view, you do not solve a problem of this sort by some huge bureaucratic investigation and report. You do it as we have tried to do it in the past -- by attempting to set standards of quality, which others hopefully are induced to emulate, and also by politely complaining about inadequacies of contributions and, upon occasion, making a mild remonstrance about the poor performance of a given representative. We have never been thanked for the latter.